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Human nature is inherently social, but it is not indiscriminately
so. As people navigate through their social lives, they embrace
some relationships and forego others. As social perceivers, we are
aware of this selectivity. We know that, to the extent that they
are able to do so, people pick and choose the individuals with
whom they develop relationships. Because few people have an inﬁ-
nite capacity for investing time and energy in new social relations,
being selective in building one’s social network is a necessity for
most humans.
One by-product of being socially selective is that people must, at
times, reject potential relationships and exclude prospective rela-
tionship partners. How do we, as social perceivers, interpret and
represent the social relations that result from the inclusion of some
people and exclusion of others? A long tradition of research has
examined how we mentally represent individuals and groups
(Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Srull & Wyer, 1989). Surprisingly,
there has been comparatively little research into the question of
how we process information about the social relationships of
others.
From the perspective of social perceivers, the ability to identify
the nature of others’ social relationships is critical. Knowledge
regarding others’ social relations allows perceivers to more accu-
rately predict the consequences of their behavior. If Jeff knows that
Jill has a relationship with Jack, but mistakenly perceives it as a
platonic friendship, he may erroneously conclude that Jill is recep-
tive to his romantic overtures. Similarly, if Keith is angry with Karl,
but knows that Karl’s good friend is Kevin, a 200-pound body-
builder, he may sensibly decline to confront Karl.
The way in which we understand others’ relationships was rec-
ognized, in earlier years, as an important issue within social per-ll rights reserved.ception. Heider (1946) suggested that people are inclined to
perceive balance in social relations. Given a triad of persons (Anna,
Barbara, and Caroline) if Anna has positive relationships with both
Barbara and Caroline, people tend to assume a positive relationship
between Barbara and Caroline as well. However, if Anna is posi-
tively associated with Barbara but negatively associated with Car-
oline, people assume a negative relationship between Barbara and
Caroline. Thus, Heider’s balance theory suggests that people are
motivated to perceive social relationships as consistent with each
other. Although this important observation is now widely accepted
(Abelson, 1983), little has been done to further our understanding
of how we mentally represent the social relationships of others.
One important exception to this rule is a model proposed by
Sedikides, Olsen, and Reis (1993) in which they conceptualized
relationships as natural categories. This conceptualization implies
that social perceivers may use relationships to organize informa-
tion in memory, just as they do for group-related information. In
building the case for relationships as categories, Sedikides et al.
(1993) reported a series of experiments which demonstrated that
participants’ recall of information they had learned about a num-
ber of individuals was organized around relationships—items asso-
ciated with two people were more likely to be retrieved in
sequence if the individuals were identiﬁed as members of a mar-
ried couple than if they were identiﬁed as acquaintances, fans of
the same football team, or randomly paired individuals. Moreover,
participants were more likely mistakenly attribute information
about one member of a couple to the other member than they were
to make similar errors about individuals who were not identiﬁed as
belonging to the same couple.
The results reported by Sedikides et al. (1993) suggest that infor-
mation about close or interdependent relationships may be pro-
cessed in a similar manner as information about other types of
categories. In their studies, the perceived closeness of relationships
was manipulated by identifying some individuals as married cou-
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important in determining whether members of a relationship are
viewed in categorical terms: ‘the interesting question here is not
which characteristics deﬁne a close relationship, but rather which
qualities lead observers to spontaneously connect relationship
partners in memory’ (p. 81). In other words, what leads social per-
ceivers to treat some relationships (but not others) as categories?
Properties of categorization
When it comes to social categories, the way a target group is
perceived is profoundly affected by the presence of other groups
in the same social context. For example, the salience of intergroup
comparisons may lead to increases in the perception that members
of the same group are similar (Castano & Yzerbyt, 1998; Corneille &
Judd, 1999; Rothbart, Davis-Stitt, & Hill, 1997) and that members
of different groups are dissimilar (Doosje, Haslam, Spears, Oakes,
& Koomen, 1998; Judd & Park, 1993).
Such effects can be attributed to the operation of two related
processes that result from categorization (Corneille & Judd, 1999;
Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978;
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). First, categoriz-
ing others into groups leads to between-group contrast—that is,
members of one group are viewed as more different frommembers
of another group than they would in the absence of categorization
(Doise, 1990; Long &Manstead, 1997). Second, categorization leads
to within-group assimilation—that is, members of the same group
are seen as more similar to each other than if they had not been
categorized (Simon & Brown, 1987). Research on these categoriza-
tion effects has, logically enough, been limited to the study of so-
cial groups—groups varying in size but typically consisting of at
least four individuals (Taylor et al., 1978) or of indeterminate size
(Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004). Yet, the same processes of assim-
ilation and contrast may equally apply to interpersonal relation-
ships in which categorization occurs.
Social exclusion and categorization
It is proposed here that social exclusion is an important cue that
may determine whether a relationship is viewed in categorical
terms. Although perceivers may categorize relationship partners
on the basis of a number of cues (e.g., an explicit commitment to
each other, see Sedikides et al., 1993), social exclusion may be
among the most salient. The observation that members of a rela-
tionship have actively excluded others may serve to highlight the
boundary between outsiders and the relationship itself. Just as
the mere presence of a second group within a social context inﬂu-
ences the extent to which a target group is subject to categoriza-
tion effects (i.e., assimilation and contrast), the mere presence of
non-members of a relationship may similarly lead to relationship
members being perceived as a category.
Although this possibility has not yet been explored in the con-
text of perceptions of interpersonal relationships, recent theorizing
by Pickett and Brewer (2005) supports the view that exclusion
leads to categorization effects when it comes to intergroup rela-
tionships. In particular, Pickett and Brewer suggest that an impor-
tant reason that some members of a group may socially exclude
others is to maximize their own feelings of inclusion in the group.
The exclusion of other ‘marginal’ group members allows individu-
als to assert their own established position within the group (see
also Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 2002). Similarly, individu-
als who identify with a social group are more likely exclude others
from the group than are those who belong, but do not identify with
the same group (Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, & Seron, 2002).
This ‘in-group over-exclusion effect’ (Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Bellour,
1995) refers to the tendency to exclude from the in-group any indi-viduals whose group membership is in doubt and is thought to be
linked to in-group identiﬁcation (see also Blascovich, Wyer, Swart,
& Kibler, 1997). Thus, in managing their perceptions of an impor-
tant in-group, individuals may use social exclusion as a way of
maximizing in-group solidarity and distinctiveness from other
groups. In other words, social exclusion contributes to within-
group assimilation and between-group contrast.
Social exclusion plays an important role in drawing group
boundaries and hence in determining how social groups are per-
ceived. When it comes to dyadic relationships, exclusion may oper-
ate in a similar way. Current theories do not address the possibility
that categorization effects occur when social exclusion takes place
on an individual rather than a group level. There are, however, rea-
sons to suppose that contrast and assimilation effects may follow
from social exclusion. For example, according to Aron’s Self-Expan-
sion Model (Aron & Aron, 1986), individuals in close relationships
develop overlapping (or assimilated) representations of them-
selves and their relationship partners (a process referred to as
self-expansion). While SEM does not go into detail about the cog-
nitive mechanisms through which another person is assimilated
to the self, research stemming from the model has identiﬁed fac-
tors associated with self-expansion. For example, shared experi-
ences that are novel (Aron, Norman, Aron, McKenna, & Heyman,
2000), humorous (Fraley & Aron, 2004) or deﬁned by mutual
self-disclosure (Aron, Melinat, Aron, Vallone, & Bator, 1997) are
all associated with greater interpersonal closeness. What these
studies have in common is that factors that lead to increased feel-
ings of closeness are those that increase the perception of uniquely
shared knowledge and experiences.
Why does uniquely shared experience generate interpersonal
closeness, whereas more mundane or commonplace experiences
do not (Aron et al., 2000)? One possibility is that awareness that
a shared experience is unique creates a category boundary. That
is, those who have shared an unusual experience may view them-
selves as members of a different category than those who have not
had that experience. Two strangers who meet in Chicago and learn
that they were on the same island in Thailand during the 2004 tsu-
nami may feel a bond based on that experience, particularly when
surrounded millions of people who do not share it. By spontane-
ously categorizing people into those who shared the experience
and those who did not, the tsunami survivors ﬁnd themselves
within the category boundary, and therefore may assimilate each
other into their self-concepts.
Likewise, sharing personal information (e.g., self-disclosure) has
been identiﬁed as a key factor contributing to closer interpersonal
relationships (e.g., Altman & Taylor, 1973; Collins & Miller, 1994).
Indeed, research by Aron et al. (1997) suggests that self-disclosure
plays a causal role in producing feelings of closeness between indi-
viduals with no prior connection to each other. Conveying personal
information about others (i.e., gossip) plays a similar role in building
social bonds (e.g., Fine, 1977). As when people share unusual expe-
riences, sharing personal information that is not commonly known
may lead to categorization based on uniquely shared knowledge.
Thus, categorization may be critical in producing effects de-
scribed by SEM. Perceiving a relationship as unique may lead to
categorization, which in turn results in assimilation of individuals
within the relationship. In the preceding examples, ‘outsiders’ are
not explicitly excluded from the relationship, but a distinction is
drawn between those within the relationship and those outside
of it. If such distinctions produce assimilation between self and
other representations, the extent of assimilation should be even
greater when exclusion is intentional and explicit.
This analysis may apply equally well to the issue of howwe rep-
resent social relationships to which we do not belong. When social
perceivers observe that social exclusion has occurred in a relation-
ship, they may draw a category boundary between the members of
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vidual(s) whom they have excluded. As a result of drawing this
boundary, perceivers may form a representation of exclusive rela-
tionships such that their members are assimilated to each other.
Assimilation may inﬂuence subjective judgments such that mem-
bers of exclusive relationship are believed to be closer or more sim-
ilar. It may also inﬂuence information processing such that
perceivers process information about members of exclusive rela-
tionships in more similar ways.
Experiment overview & hypotheses
Three studies are described below that investigate these possi-
bilities. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with brief
scenarios, each describing an encounter among a number of people.
In some of these encounters, two individuals shared personal infor-
mation with each other while explicitly withholding that informa-
tion from a third person. Thus, in some instances, participants
learned that the relationship being depicted was characterized by
social exclusion. In other scenarios, no explicit exclusion took place.
Participants’ subjective perceptions of these relationships were
then assessed. In Experiments 2 and 3, cognitive assimilation and
contrast effects were explored more directly using a memory con-
fusion paradigm. In all cases, social exclusionwas expected to result
in assimilation, as evidenced by judgments of relationship close-
ness (Experiment 1) and by the extent of differentiation between
relationship members (Experiments 2 and 3).1 For exploratory purposes, the scenarios included instances where the commu-
nication shared between targets concerned one of the targets him/herself (i.e., self-
disclosure) as well as instances where it involved a third party (i.e., gossip). These
variations had no signiﬁcant effects nor did they interact with any other variable.
Hence, they are not discussed here.
2 Preliminary analyses involving both participant gender and target gender were
carried out for this study as well as all subsequent studies. These analyses produced
no signiﬁcant main effects of gender (either participants’ or targets’) or interactions
involving gender (either participants’ or targets’)Experiment 1
In many social contexts, individuals learn about and form
impressions of a wide variety of targets: other individuals, other
groups, as well as others’ friendships or close relationships. As sug-
gested above, the representations that one builds of others’ rela-
tionships may be inﬂuenced by the social exclusiveness of their
interactions. The ability to identify the nature of others’ relation-
ships is important because it provides information on a number
of issues. Is the relationship permeable (e.g., is it possible to join
the relationship)? Can one member of the relationship be expected
to share information or characteristics (e.g., knowledge, goals, or
motives) with the other? Can one relationship partner be held
responsible for the acts of the other? The ability to make accurate
inferences about the closeness of a particular relationship helps to
inform all of these questions.
In Experiment1, the effect of social exclusionon theperceptionof
social relationships was investigated by exposing participants to
brief scenariosabout anumberof social relationships, someofwhich
were characterized by social exclusion. According to the reasoning
introducedabove, exclusive relationships shouldbeviewedas closer
thannon-exclusive ones. In addition, to assess the effect of exclusion
on inferences other than closeness, participantswere asked tomake
anumber of additional judgments following each scenario. In partic-
ular, participants were asked to judge the extent to which the rela-
tionship was unique and reciprocal, and the extent to which
members of the relationshipwere similar in terms of their personal-
ities and backgrounds. To the extent that social exclusion is a cue to
view a relationship as a category, members of exclusive relation-
ships should be viewed as closer andmore similar, and the relation-
ship should be characterized as more reciprocal and more unique.
Method
Participants
Sixty students (20 males, 40 females) at the Free University of
Amsterdam (NL) participated in this study in exchange for €2.50(approximately $3.50). Participants were tested individually in iso-
lated cubicles. The experiment took approximately 10–15 min to
complete.
Design and materials
The study involved a within-participants design, in which par-
ticipants were exposed to three exclusion conditions (exclusion,
inclusion, or control). Twelve scenarios were constructed for use
in this study.1 Each scenario depicted an interaction among two or
three individuals of the same sex (half of the scenarios in each con-
dition portrayed female targets while the other half portrayed male
targets). Different forenames were used in each scenario, so that
each interaction would be perceived as independent of the others.
In the control condition, one of the people (Target 1 or T1) conveyed
personal information with one other person (Target 2 or T2). In the
exclusion condition, T1 conveyed the same information to T2, while
ensuring that a third person (Target 3 or T3) was not present during
the interaction. In the inclusion condition, T1 conveyed the informa-
tion to both T2 and T3. The speciﬁc behaviors were counterbalanced
such that, across participants, all behaviors appeared in exclusion,
inclusion, and control conditions and involved both male and female
protagonists.
Procedure
Participants were introduced to a study on how people perceive
the relationships of others. They were informed that they would
read about a number of different relationships, and that they
would make judgments about the nature of each relationship. Par-
ticipants then read each of the 12 scenarios, the order of which was
randomized. After each scenario, participants were asked to judge
the degree of closeness between T1 and T2 and between T1 and T3.
They were then asked to judge the relationship between T1 and T2
on a number of dimensions. Speciﬁcally, participants rated the
likelihood that T1 would share the same information with others
(uniqueness), the likelihood that T2 would share similar informa-
tion with T1 (reciprocity), and the similarity of T1 and T2 in terms
of their personalities and backgrounds. Ratings were made on a 9-
point scale (1 = not at all to 9 = extremely).
Results2
Closeness of T1 and T3 (manipulation check)
Participants’ ratings of the closeness of T1 and T3 were analyzed
using a paired samples t-test in which exclusion and inclusion con-
ditions were compared. The analysis indicated a signiﬁcant differ-
ence such that participants rated the two targets as signiﬁcantly
closer when T3 was included in the interaction (M = 6.34,
s = 0.92) than he or she was excluded (M = 3.90, s = 1.26),
t(59) = 11.75, p < .001 d = 2.21.
Closeness of T1 and T2
The critical dependent measure was participants’ perceptions of
the closeness of T1 and T2. A repeated-measures Analysis of Vari-
ance (ANOVA) was conducted to assess the effect of exclusion on
perceived T1–T2 closeness. This analysis revealed a signiﬁcant
Table 1
Mean ratings of T1–T2 relationship closeness, uniqueness, reciprocity and similarity
(Experiment 1)
Exclusion Control Inclusion
Closeness 7.02a (0.86) 6.56b (0.87) 6.33b (0.91)
Uniqueness 4.61a (1.28) 5.72b (1.21) 6.05b (1.26)
Reciprocity 6.24a (0.94) 6.06ab (1.19) 5.83b (0.97)
Similarity 6.15a (0.97) 5.91b (1.00) 5.78b (0.99)
Higher numbers indicated greater closeness, reciprocity, and similarity and less
uniqueness. Means within a row marked with different superscripts are signiﬁ-
cantly different from each other (p < .05).
1006 N.A. Wyer / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44 (2008) 1003–1012main effect of exclusion condition, F(2, 118) = 16.04, p < .001,
gp
2 = .21.3 Follow-up paired samples t-tests indicated that partici-
pants rated the T1–T2 relationship as signiﬁcantly closer in the
exclusion condition than in either the control condition,
t(59) = 4.07, p < .001, d = .53 or the inclusion condition, t(59) = 5.73,
p < .001, d = .78, the difference between which was marginally sig-
niﬁcant, t(59) = 1.70, p < .10, d = .26. See Table 1 for means and stan-
dard deviations.
Uniqueness, reciprocity, and similarity
In addition to rating the closeness of the T1–T2 relationship,
participants judged the uniqueness and reciprocity of the relation-
ship, and the similarity of the two interactants. Each of these rat-
ings was examined using the same analytic strategy described
above. In each case, there was a signiﬁcant main effect of exclusion
such that higher ratings were obtained in the exclusion condition
than in the inclusion or control conditions, smallest F(2,
118) = 3.85, p < .03, gp2 = .06 (see Table 1).
In addition, indices of exclusion and inclusion effects on similar-
ity, uniqueness, and reciprocity ratings were calculated by sub-
tracting ratings in the control condition from those in the
exclusion and inclusion conditions, respectively. These indices
were entered as covariates in a repeated-measures ANCOVA com-
paring closeness ratings among the three exclusion conditions.
Although inclusion effects on uniqueness (F(2, 106) = 5.38,
p < .01. gp2 = .09) and reciprocity (F(2, 106) = 2.71, p < .08,
gp
2 = .05) emerged as signiﬁcant or marginally signiﬁcant covari-
ates, the main effect of exclusion condition remained signiﬁcant
even with all covariates included in the analysis, F(2, 106) = 3.37,
p < .04, gp2 = .06. Importantly the within-subjects contrast compar-
ing the exclusion condition against the inclusion and control con-
ditions was also signiﬁcant, F(1, 53) = 6.29, p < .02, gp2 = .11.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 supported the hypothesis that so-
cial exclusion is used as a cue to treat relationships as catego-
ries—participants judged exclusive relationships to be
signiﬁcantly closer than non-exclusive relationships. Thus, these
results support the proposal that social exclusion leads to catego-
rization-based assimilation of relationship partners. Further evi-
dence is provided by the ﬁnding that social exclusion inﬂuences
perceptions of relationship reciprocity and uniqueness, and judg-
ments of similarity between the relationship partners. These re-
sults are consistent with the view that exclusion affects
perceived closeness by encouraging perceivers to categorize T1
and T2 into a separate category than T3 (suggested by higher sim-3 Although the goal of brevity precludes their full reporting, it is worth noting that
the effect of exclusion on perceived closeness has been replicated in three other
experiments including a further 170 participants, F’s = 19.55 to 44.00, all p’s < .001; d
= .46 to .59 (average d = .53).ilarity ratings) and consequently assimilating T1 and T2 (suggested
by higher ratings of the relationship’s uniqueness and reciprocity).
While the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the
framework presented earlier, a number of limitations must be ad-
dressed. First, a potential criticism of Experiment 1 concerns its
reliance on self-report measures obtained from a within-partici-
pants design. Because of the design, explicit comparisons among
scenarios were possible, which raises the possibility that demand
characteristics contributed to the results.
In addition, although the judgment measures used in Experi-
ment 1 are consistent with the premise that social exclusion
encourages categorization, resulting in increases in perceived rela-
tionship closeness, they do not provide a direct investigation of
how relationship partners are mentally represented. The ﬁnding
that partners are perceived as closer under exclusion conditions
than under inclusion or control conditions does not necessarily
indicate that participants’ representations of them have been
assimilated.
Moreover, if assimilation did occur, it is still possible that factors
other than exclusion per se were responsible for the ﬁnding that T1
and T2 were perceived as closer when they excluded T3. For exam-
ple, participants may have formed relatively negative evaluations
of T1 and T2 because they perpetrated the exclusion of T3 (towards
whom they may have reacted with greater sympathy). Although no
data relating to participants’ evaluations of the targets are avail-
able to address the possibility, it may be that such differing evalu-
ations of T1 and T2 versus T3 contributed to categorization and
hence inﬂuenced the perceived closeness of the three targets.
Experiments 2a and 2b were conducted to address concerns
about alternative interpretations of the data (by using a fully be-
tween-participants design) as well as to provide a more direct
measure of how people mentally represent exclusive and non-
exclusive relationships.Experiment 2
If one’s mental representations of two people are assimilated,
one should be less likely to differentiate between information re-
lated to those people. For example, Mashek, Aron, and Boncimino
(2003), asked participants to judge three different lists of personal-
ity trait words. In each list, they judged whether the trait described
either themselves, a close other, or a familiar but non-close other.
Later, participants were presented with words from all three lists
and were asked to indicate the person for whom they had judged
each of them. In analyzing participants’ errors, Mashek and col-
leagues observed that participants were most likely to make errors
in which words judged for the self and words judged for the close
other were confused.
Experiment 2 adapted the paradigm used by Mashek et al
(2003; see also Sedikides et al., 1993) to assess whether represen-
tations of two people in a relationship are less differentiated (i.e.,
assimilated) when the relationship socially excludes others. If one’s
mental representations of two people in a relationship are assimi-
lated, one should be more likely to confuse information encoded in
relation to one relationship partner for that encoded in relation to
the other. According to the framework outlined earlier, this should
be the case when perceivers encode information about two indi-
viduals who exclude a third person (e.g., T1 and T2 in the previous
experiment).Experiment 2a
If, as expected, participants make more memory confusions
involving members of socially exclusive relationships than mem-
bers of non-exclusive relationships, this would provide direct evi-
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used in categorization. However, at least one competing account
must be considered. Speciﬁcally, social exclusion, as manipulated
in Experiment 1, is partially confounded with shared distinctive-
ness. In the ﬁrst experiment, two targets in an exclusive relation-
ship share distinctive features (e.g., the fact that they engaged in
exclusion and the fact that they have information unknown by oth-
ers) that are not shared by the excluded target.
These distinctive features may contribute to assimilation effects
in two ways. First, prior research (e.g., Nelson & Miller, 1995) sug-
gests that perceivers use distinctive features as a basis for catego-
rization. Thus, participants may categorize T1 and T2 because they
share distinctive features, which may contribute to assimilation ef-
fects. According to this view, the observation that two targets share
any distinctive feature is sufﬁcient to elicit categorization—the fea-
ture need not have anything to do with social exclusion. Thus,
shared distinctiveness—and not social exclusion—may result in
categorization.
A second way in which shared distinctiveness may affect assim-
ilation is by increasing perceived similarity among the relationship
partners after they have been categorized. According to Tversky’s
(1977) model of similarity, the greater the number of distinctive
features shared among category members, the greater the per-
ceived similarity will be. This view suggests that targets who
shared distinctive features because of circumstances having noth-
ing to do with exclusion might be viewed as more similar, which
may have contributed to the results found in the ﬁrst two experi-
ments. Thus, shared distinctiveness—and not social exclusion—
may lead to assimilation effects once categorization had occurred.
The possibility that shared distinctiveness or similarity alone
leads to assimilation effects is argued against by the results of Exper-
iment 1, which indicated that target similarity was not a signiﬁcant
covariate, nor did target similarity, relationship reciprocity, or rela-
tionship uniqueness account for the effects of exclusion on per-
ceived closeness. When all of these variables were controlled for,
the effect of exclusion on perceived closeness remained signiﬁcant.
To provide further evidence that exclusion produces unique ef-
fects on relationship representation beyond that accounted for by
shared distinctiveness, Experiment 2a includes a direct comparison
of an exclusion condition with one in which targets share distinc-
tive features not related to exclusion. If categorization and assim-
ilation are due to shared distinctiveness rather than exclusion per
se, then assimilation effects should also be found in this condition.
A second goal of Experiment 2a is to investigate the role of
intention in producing exclusion-based categorization. Experiment
1 utilized a manipulation that involved intentional acts of social
exclusion. Yet, there may be instances where social exclusion oc-
curs due to situational factors rather than the explicit intentions
of those who engage in it. The preceding analysis implies that
while intentionality may make exclusion more salient, it may not
be strictly necessary for exclusion-based categorization to occur.
To examine the role of intention more closely, a further condition
was included in Experiment 2a in which two targets exclude a
third person as the result of situational factors.
Method
Participants
Eighty members of the Plymouth (UK) community (29 males
and 51 females) participated in this and an unrelated experiment
in exchange for £3 (approximately $6). The experiment lasted
approximately 15 min.
Design and procedure
The experiment employed a between-participants design, in
which ﬁve groups of participants received different informationabout a social relationship (inclusion, intentional exclusion, unin-
tentional exclusion, shared distinctiveness, or control).
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were informed that
they would be taking part in a study on how people perceive social
relationships. Participants were initially introduced to three peo-
ple, Anna, Janine, and Sandra (hereafter T1, T2, and T3) who were
described as members of the same social group. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of ﬁve relationship information condi-
tions. Participants in all conditions learned that the three targets
belonged to a student group and had known each other for one
year. Those in the control condition were given no further informa-
tion. Participants in the shared distinctiveness condition also
learned that, by coincidence, T1 and T2 shared the same birthday.
Participants in the other three conditions learned that T1 and T2
spend a lot of time together discussing events from their own lives
as well as the lives of others in their group. Those in the inclusion
condition learned that T1 and T2 often tried to include T3 in their
discussions. Those in the intentional exclusion condition learned
that T1 and T2 always made a point of keeping T3 out of their dis-
cussions. Those in the unintentional exclusion condition learned
that T1 and T2 wanted to include T3 in their discussions, but be-
cause T3 worked and lived out of town, she was never present dur-
ing their discussions.
After reading the information about the relationships among
the three targets, participants were informed that they would form
impressions of two of the three targets (T1 and T2) by learning a
series of personality traits that described each of them. Participants
were then presented with a list of 20 personality trait words that
described T1 and a second list of 20 trait words that described
T2. All words were randomly selected from Anderson’s (1968) list
of personality trait words. The order of the T1 and T2 lists was
counterbalanced. After viewing the two lists, participants were
asked to take a few minutes to think about their impressions of
the two individuals. Participants then received instructions for a
recognition task. Participants were presented with the 40 person-
ality trait words that had been presented during the preceding
two lists as well as with 40 trait words that had not been previ-
ously presented. Participants were instructed to indicate whether
each word had described T1 or T2, or had not been presented at
all, by pressing one of two keys on the computer keyboard.
Results
Words presented during the recognition task can be classiﬁed as
‘Target 1’ (words that described T1), ‘Target 2’ (words that de-
scribed T2), and ‘new’ (words that were not presented at all). Thus,
each response can be classiﬁed as either a ‘hit’ (correctly identify-
ing the target who had been described by the word), a ‘confusion’
(attributing a word that had described one target to the other tar-
get), a ‘miss’ (failing to recognize that a word had described either
target), a ‘false alarm’ (indicating that a new word had described
either of the two targets) or a ‘correct rejection’ (correctly indicat-
ing that a new word had not been presented). Because misses are
the complement of the combination of hits and confusions, and
similarly correct rejections are the complement of false alarms,
only hits, confusions, and false alarms were analyzed.
Memory confusion errors were calculated as the proportion of
times (out of a total of 40 trials) that a trait that had been pre-
sented for one target was attributed to the other. A one-way ANO-
VA comparing the ﬁve conditions revealed a signiﬁcant main effect
of relationship information, F(4, 79) = 4.41, p < 01, gp2 = .19.
Planned comparisons were conducted to compare the intentional
exclusion condition to each of the other four conditions. These anal-
yses indicated that whereas confusion rates did not signiﬁcantly
differ in the intentional exclusion and unintentional exclusion condi-
tions, t(75) = .65, ns, d = .17, rates were signiﬁcantly higher in the
Table 2
Mean proportion of recognition responses in Experiment 2a (hit = correctly stating that a word had described the appropriate target person; confusion = incorrectly stating that a
word had described the inappropriate target person; false alarm = incorrectly stating that a non-presented word had described either target person)
Intentional exclusion Unintentional exclusion Shared distinctiveness Inclusion No information
Hit 0.46ab (0.15) 0.37b (0.17) 0.43ab (0.14) 0.43ab (0.08) 0.53a (0.17)
Confusion 0.34a (0.10) 0.32a (0.13) 0.28ab (0.10) 0.23b (0.08) 0.23b (0.07)
False Alarm 0.37a (0.15) 0.38a (0.21) 0.30a (0.18) 0.26a (0.13) 0.27a (0.14)
Means within a row marked with different superscripts are signiﬁcantly different (p < .05).
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(t(75) = 3.19, p < .01, d = 1.27) or inclusion (t(75) = 3.32, p < .01,
d = 1.21) conditions, and marginally higher than in the shared dis-
tinctiveness condition, t(75) = 1.84, p < .07, d = .60.
Subsequent analyses indicated that exclusion condition had a
marginally signiﬁcant effect on hit rates, F(4, 79) = 2.37, p = .06,
gp
2 = .11 but a non-signiﬁcant effect on false alarms F(4,
79) = 1.98, p > .10, gp2 = .10). The complete set of means and stan-
dard deviations are presented in Table 2.
Experiment 2b
As noted above, participants in the distinctiveness condition
differed only marginally in their confusion rates (although the
exclusion condition was signiﬁcantly different from the control
condition whereas the distinctiveness condition was not). Thus, it
is not possible to completely rule out the possibility that percep-
tions of shared distinctiveness contributed to the exclusion effects
reported in Experiment 2a. The purpose of Experiment 2b was to
provide an explicit test of the extent to which perceptions of
shared distinctiveness mediate the effect of exclusion on assimila-
tion as assessed by memory confusions.
Method
Participants
Twenty-two members of the Plymouth (UK) community (14 fe-
males, 8 males) took part in this and an unrelated experiment in
exchange for £3 (approximately $6).
Design and procedure
Experiment 2b involved a two-group between-participants de-
sign. Participants were randomly assigned to either the exclusion
or control condition. The procedures were identical to those de-
scribed in Experiment 2a, with the exception that participants an-
swered additional questions after the recognition task. Speciﬁcally,
participants were asked to rate how unusual it is for two people to
socially exclude another person, how meaningful social exclusion
is to the people who do it, how similar T1 and T2 were to each
other, and how unique the relationship between T1 and T2 was.
All ratings were made on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all, 9 = very
much).
Results
Memory confusions, hits, and false alarmswere calculated as de-
scribed in Experiment 2a. In order to assess whether the effects of
exclusion on memory errors were replicated, a series of indepen-
dent-samples t-tests were conducted. Of primary importance, par-
ticipants in the exclusion condition made signiﬁcantly more
memory confusions (M = .28, s = .16) than did those in the control
condition (M = .15, s = .09), t(20) = 2.43, p < .03, d = 1.00. In addition,
participants in the exclusion condition also produced fewer hits
(M = .45, s = .18) than did those in the control condition (M = .65,
s = .11), t(20) = 3.12, p < .01, d = 1.34. However, there was no signiﬁ-
cant difference in false alarm rates, t(20) = .54, ns, d = .24.In order to examine the role that perceptions of distinctiveness
may have played in producing assimilation, an Analysis of Covari-
ance (ANCOVA) was carried out in which participants’ ratings of
the unusualness and meaningfulness of social exclusion were en-
tered as covariates. Neither covariate proved to be signiﬁcant (larg-
est F(1, 22) = 1.25, p > .25, gp2 = .07). Moreover, the effect of
exclusion condition remained signiﬁcant, F(1, 22) = 5.98, p < .03,
gp
2 = .25) when those covariates were added. A similar analysis
was conducted using relationship-speciﬁc measures of shared dis-
tinctiveness (participants’ ratings of how similar T1 and T2 were
and of how unique their relationship was). Again, neither covariate
was signiﬁcant, largest F(1, 22) = 1.31, p > .25, gp2 = .02, while the
main effect of exclusion remained marginally signiﬁcant, F(1,
22) = 3.82, p < .07, gp2 = .23.
Discussion
Experiments 2a and 2b provided important clariﬁcations of the
results found in Experiment 1. First, they provide direct evidence
that mental representations of individuals in relationships charac-
terized by social exclusion are assimilated. Thus, while the results
of Experiment 1 may have been clouded by the possibility of de-
mand characteristics, that interpretation becomes less plausible
in light of the memory confusion results found in Experiments 2a
and 2b.
In addition, as noted earlier, an alternative interpretation of
exclusion-based assimilation effects is that the responses of partic-
ipants in the exclusion conditions were, in fact, the result of tar-
gets’ sharing distinctive features rather than of exclusion per se.
The results of Experiments 2a and 2b do not support this interpre-
tation. Participants in the exclusion condition made more memory
confusions than participants in either the control or inclusion con-
ditions. In contrast, participants in the shared distinctiveness con-
dition produced no more memory confusions than did those in the
control and inclusion conditions, as would be expected if categori-
zation of T1 and T2 resulted from any indication of shared distinc-
tiveness. Simply being similar on a distinctive dimension is not
sufﬁcient to produce categorization or assimilation effects. Indeed,
although participants in the distinctiveness condition of Experi-
ment 2a did not signiﬁcantly differ from those in either the con-
trol/inclusion or the two exclusion conditions, the results of
Experiment 2b strongly suggest that perceptions of distinctiveness
are not responsible for the observed exclusion effects. This ﬁnding
is consistent with existing research on categorization (Murphy &
Medin, 1985; Nosofsky, 1986; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass,
1992) which suggests that people are more likely to form and/or
perceive categories when the potential basis for categorization is
perceived as meaningful or diagnostic. In the present studies, acts
of social exclusion are likely to be such meaningful and diagnostic
cues to view targets in categorical ways. In contrast, although sim-
ilarity is certainly an important factor inﬂuencing the categoriza-
tion process under some circumstances (Tversky, 1977), it is
not—by itself—enough to trigger categorization in the present
context.
The results of Experiment 2a also demonstrate that exclusion
need not be intentional for it to produce categorization effects.
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the unintentional exclusion condition and those in the control
and inclusion conditions did not reach signiﬁcance. However, the
results (in particular, the ﬁnding that unintentional and intentional
exclusion led to similar levels of memory confusions) suggest that
exclusion may produce categorization effects even when it results
from situational factors rather than from the will of those who
exclude.
The results of the shared distinctiveness and unintentional
exclusion conditions, taken together, imply a more complex pic-
ture of social exclusion and categorization-based assimilation ef-
fects. In contrast to the alternative account suggested by other
theories (e.g., Nelson & Miller, 1995; Tversky, 1977), simply shar-
ing distinctive features is not sufﬁcient in this context to trigger
categorization or to result in assimilation. Thus, social exclusion
does appear to play a unique role in these processes. However,
the results of this experiment also suggest that intentional or ac-
tive exclusion may not be necessary to produce the effects ob-
served in previous studies. Albeit to a lesser extent, unintended
exclusion also resulted in an elevated level of memory confusions,
suggesting that it, too, produces categorization and subsequent
assimilation.Table 3
Mean proportion of recognition responses in Experiment 3, (hit = correctly stating
that a target word had described the target person; confusion = incorrectly stating
that a lure word described the target person; false alarm = indicating that a new word
had described the target person)
Exclusion 1 Control Exclusion 2
Hit 0.61a (0.14) 0.68b (0.11) 0.70b (0.12)
Confusion 0.49a (0.16) 0.40b (0.13) 0.33c (0.15)
False Alarm 0.37a (0.15) 0.38a (0.18) 0.33a (0.15)
Note that participants in the Exclusion 1 and Control conditions carried out the
recognition task for targets T1 and T2 (the two members of the central relationship)
whereas participants in the Exclusion 2 condition carried out the task for targets T1
and T3 (one member of the central relationship and the person who had been
excluded from it).
Means within a row marked with different superscripts are signiﬁcantly different
from each other (p < .05).Experiment 3
While the results of Experiment 2 provided direct evidence that
perceivers assimilate their impressions of individuals in socially
exclusive relationships, they did not address the possibility of con-
trast between those and impressions of excluded individuals. The
analysis offered earlier suggests that one’s representation of a third
person should be more differentiated (i.e., contrasted) when he or
she is excluded from a relationship than when he or she is not
explicitly excluded. To the extent that one’s mental representa-
tions of two people are contrasted, one should be less likely to con-
fuse information encoded in relation to one of those people for that
encoded in relation to the other. This should occur when perceivers
encode information about one of the two members of a relation-
ship along with a third person who has been excluded (e.g., T1
and T3 in the previous experiments).
To test this hypothesis, participants were given information
about two friends who either excluded a third person or not. Par-
ticipants formed an impression of two targets (either the two
friends, or one of the friends and the excluded person) by reading
personality trait words that described each of them. After the trait
lists were presented, participants performed a recognition task in
which they identiﬁed whether each of the words had been pre-
sented in the description of one or the other target.
Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty students (51 male and 69 female) at
the Free University of Amsterdam (NL) participated in this experi-
ment in exchange for €2.50. The experiment lasted for approxi-
mately 15 min.
Design and procedures
The experiment involved a between-participants design, in
which participants were randomly assigned to one of three exclu-
sion conditions (exclusion 1, exclusion 2, or control).
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were informed that
they would be taking part in a study on how people perceive social
relationships. Participants were initially introduced to three peo-
ple, Anna, Janine, and Sandra (T1, T2, and T3) who were described
as members of the same social group. Participants in the exclusion 1and exclusion 2 conditions learned that T1 and T2 spent a lot of
time together discussing events from their own or other group
members’ lives and that they always made sure that T3 was not
present when they had these discussions. Participants in the con-
trol condition were not given this information.
Participants were then informed that they would form impres-
sions of two of the individuals. Participants in the control and exclu-
sion 1 conditions were to form an impression of T1 and T2 (i.e., the
two targets who belonged to the central relationship), while those
in the exclusion 2 condition were to form an impression of T1 and
T3 (i.e., one target who belonged to the central relationship along
with the target who was excluded from the relationship). Partici-
pants were presented with two lists of 20 trait words, each list
describing one of the two targets. The order of the lists and the tar-
gets described by each were counterbalanced across participants.
Within each list, the trait words were presented one at a time,
for 2 s each (separated by a 1-s pause) on a computer screen, with
the target’s name remaining on the screen to the left of each word.
After reading both lists, participants completed a brief distracter
task after which they completed a recognition task similar to that
described in Experiment 2a.
Results
Memory confusions, hits, and false alarms were calculated as
described in Experiment 2a. To assess the extent to which partici-
pants differentiated between information learned about the two
targets, confusions were analyzed using a one-way ANOVA in
which exclusion condition was entered as the independent vari-
able. This analysis yielded a signiﬁcant main effect, F(2,
117) = 11.19, p < .001, gp2 = .16. Planned contrasts conﬁrmed that
participants in the exclusion 1 condition made more memory con-
fusions than did those in either the control condition, t(117) = 2.67,
p < .01, d = .49, or the exclusion 2 condition, t(117) = 4.72, p < .001,
d = .87, which also signiﬁcantly differed from one another,
t(117) = 2.04, p < .05, d = .38. Means and standard deviations can
be found in Table 3.
Subsequent analyses indicated a further signiﬁcant effect of
exclusion condition on hits (F(2, 117) = 5.71), p < .01, gp2 = .09, such
that participants in the exclusion 1 condition produced a lower pro-
portion of hits than those in the control, t(117) = 2.28, p < .03,
d = 2.28, or exclusion 2 conditions, t(117) = 3.30 p < .01, d = .61,
which did not signiﬁcantly differ, t(117) = 1.02, p > .30, d = .19. This
ﬁnding is, perhaps, not surprising in light of the fact that partici-
pants may have believed that target words had actually described
the other target person. Given the absence of any effect of exclu-
sion condition on false alarms, F(2, 117) = 1.10, ns, gp2 = .02, the ex-
tent to which exclusion decreases recognition accuracy appears to
be due to an increase in memory confusions rather than a general
impairment on memory performance.
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Experiment 3 replicated Experiments 2a and 2b by utilizing a
memory confusion paradigm to investigate the extent to which
participants’ mental representations of individuals with different
types of relationships overlap (i.e., are assimilated). If one’s repre-
sentations of two individuals overlap, one should be less able to
distinguish between information related to one versus the other
of them. Consistent with expectations, evidence was found for a
greater degree of assimilation when the relationship excluded oth-
ers than when it did not. This was indicated by a greater number of
memory confusions in the exclusion condition than in the control
condition.
On the other hand, participants formed relatively well-differen-
tiated representations of two people who they viewed as being on
opposite sides of the relationship boundary. When participants
learned about one of the two relationship members along with a
third person who had been actively excluded from the relationship,
they made relatively few memory confusion errors. This suggests
that participants were well able to distinguish between what they
knew about the two targets.
Thus, these results support the hypothesis that social exclusion
leads to assimilation of people in the exclusive relationship. When
a boundary is recognized between two people in a relationship and
others outside of it, one’s representations of those people merge
such that information processed in relation to one person is treated
as if it applied to the other. These results are also consistent with
those of the ﬁrst experiment, which indicated that people perceive
socially exclusive relationships as closer, more unique and more
reciprocal, and members of such relationships as more similar.
In contrast, among participants in the exclusion 2 condition, the
ability to distinguish between information learned about two tar-
gets was enhanced. This suggests that when the two targets fall
on opposite sides of a boundary (e.g., one is included and one is ex-
cluded), those targets become more distinctive from each other.
Again, this supports the idea that social exclusion leads to catego-
rization, this time by demonstrating that contrast effects occur for
individuals who are excluded.General discussion
The experiments reported here support the hypothesis that per-
ceivers use information regarding social exclusion to draw cate-
gory boundaries between different sets of individuals. When two
members of a relationship actively include another person in their
interactions, that third person is included within the relationship-
based category. In contrast, and more interestingly, when the third
person is actively prevented from joining the relationship, the cat-
egory boundary is strengthened, with the excluded individual on
the opposite side of the boundary. As a result of strengthening
the category boundary, assimilation effects are more likely to oc-
cur. That is, the perceiver’s representations of individuals within
the relationship are more likely to merge.
In Experiment 1, perceivers’ judgments about the closeness of
various relationships reﬂected these processes. Participants consis-
tently judged two individuals to be closer when they actively ex-
cluded others from their interactions, compared to when others
were included in those interactions or were not mentioned at all.
This pattern emerged despite the fact that the interactions them-
selves were identical across conditions—the only difference among
conditions was whether a third person was or was not excluded
from them. Thus, perceivers appear to use information about
exclusion to draw inferences about interpersonal closeness. These
inferences may be based upon the psychological distance of the
perceivers’ stored representations of relationship partners.Experiments 2 and 3 provided more direct evidence about how
relationships are represented in memory. When two individuals in
a relationship socially exclude a third person, perceivers’ represen-
tations of them become less differentiated, leading to a greater
likelihood that information related to one relationship partner will
be misattributed to the other. In contrast, the results of Experiment
3 suggested that representations of an excluded individual may be-
come more differentiated from those of the relationship partners,
leading to a lower likelihood of memory confusions involving the
excluded individual.
The current work represents an initial foray into studying the
consequences of exclusion for the mental representation of social
relationships. While the topic of social exclusion has received sub-
stantial attention in recent years (e.g., Baumeister & Tice, 1990;
Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Wil-
liams, 2003), this work has focused primarily on the consequences
of exclusion for those who have been excluded. As argued at the
outset of this paper, social exclusion may also play an important
role in shaping our perceptions of other people’s relationships.
These perceptions may in turn have important consequences for
our judgments and expectations of individuals involved in those
relationships. Until now, this question has been neither asked
nor answered in the psychological literature. Thus, the research
presented here provides ﬁrst insights into how impressions of so-
cial relationships are formed.
These studies raise further questions about the consequences of
how relationships are represented. As suggested earlier, the per-
ceived closeness of a relationship has repercussions for how we
judge other aspects of the relationship. Experiment 1 suggests that,
if a relationship is seen as particularly close, perceivers may judge
its members to be more similar in terms of their personalities and
social backgrounds. A related possibility is that closer relationships
may be viewed as less permeable, which may inﬂuence our behav-
ior towards members of the relationship. We may be less inclined
to pursue or develop relationships with members of a relationship
(whether it is a friendship or a romantic partnership) that is seen
as exclusive, close, and impermeable. The question of whether so-
cially exclusive relationships are viewed as not only closer but also
less permeable is open to further investigation.
A further implication that bares consideration concerns the
assumptions perceivers make about members of exclusive rela-
tionships. If relationship partners are presumed to share common
characteristics—such as knowledge and goals—perceivers may hold
one partner responsible for the actions of the other. Thus, the
exclusiveness and consequent closeness of a relationship may
inﬂuence judgments of collective responsibility (e.g., Lickel, Sch-
mader, & Hamilton, 2003) and assumptions about collective emo-
tions (Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2005).
Is explicit exclusion necessary and sufﬁcient?
The theoretical framework adopted here suggests that the per-
ception of social exclusion triggers a categorization process. This
raises the question of whether exclusion, by itself, is sufﬁcient to
elicit categorization. To what extent need the individuals engaged
in exclusion share a common bond independent of the act of exclu-
sion? The data presented here do not directly address this ques-
tion, as the perpetrators of exclusion were always members of a
social relationship. However, recent research by Zadro, Williams,
and Richardson (2005) has demonstrated that strangers who are
induced to socially exclude another person develop greater feelings
of closeness to each other (see discussion below). Thus, exclusion
in the absence of pre-existing bonds may be sufﬁcient to produce
the effects described here.
Finally, there remain questions about what cues people use to
determine whether social exclusion has taken place. In the studies
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guity about whether or not relationship partners have excluded
someone else. However, there may be more subtle cues from
which perceivers infer social exclusion. For example, observing
that two individuals consistently share conﬁdential information
with each other may lead one to infer that they exclude others, be-
cause others are not explicitly included in their conﬁdences. Fur-
ther, perceivers may detect non-verbal cues that imply social
exclusion, such as covert eye contact (i.e., two people taking side-
long glances at each other; see Kurzban, 2001) or speaking at low
volumes to prevent others from overhearing.
Exclusion and the self
Social exclusion has been subject to social psychological study
from a number of perspectives. For example, Baumeister, Williams,
and colleagues (e.g., Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Eisenberger et al.,
2003) have generated a large body of research demonstrating var-
ious consequences of being socially excluded or ostracized.
Although the bulk of this work concerns the experience of those
who are targets of exclusion, Williams has suggested a number
of motives for engaging in social exclusion. For example, social
exclusion may be a tool used by individuals or groups to exert
behavioral control on others (e.g., to punish deviant behavior). In
addition, Kurzban and Leary’s (2001) evolutionary approach argues
that the social exclusion of individuals and groups may serve an
adaptive function in that it allows people to avoid others who
may be poor partners for social exchange or who may pose threats
to our physical well-being. Though intriguing, neither analysis ad-
dresses the possible consequences of engaging in social exclusion
for how one perceives and mentally represents one’s own relation-
ships from which others are excluded.
The data presented here, however, suggest clear predictions on
this issue. If witnessing social exclusion by others leads to catego-
rization of the individuals involved, it is perhaps even more likely
that engaging in exclusion would do the same. Thus, one who ac-
tively excludes others from a relationship may experience greater
intimacy with the other person in the relationship. In support of
this notion, recent research from the author’s laboratory suggests
that leading individuals to view a friendship as exclusive has a di-
rect effect on their experience of closeness within that relationship.
In addition, Zadro et al. (2005) established that participants who
role played an act of social exclusion reported, in some cases,
greater feelings of belonging than did those who role played an
act of inclusion or an act of verbal dispute. Thus, the social exclu-
sion of others from one’s relationships may serve the important
function of increasing the extent to which one feels a bond with
one’s relationship partners.
Mechanisms underlying exclusion effects
A further question arising from this work concerns the stage at
which categorization-based assimilation effects occur. In all stud-
ies presented in this paper, exclusion information was presented
ﬁrst, with memory and judgment measures collected later. Partic-
ularly in Experiments 2 and 3, this procedure ensured that catego-
rization had taken place before further impressions of the target
individuals had been formed. Thus, the assimilation of those indi-
viduals likely occurred prior to encoding the trait information
about them. One potential criticism of this method is that partici-
pants were simply less motivated to discriminate between individ-
uals who were included, which might call into question the
conclusion that the patterns of memory confusions were due to
assimilation.
This raises the question of how pre-existing representations
(i.e., impressions of familiar others) are inﬂuenced by exclusion.If exclusion leads to assimilation of those within a relationship,
similar effects should be observable even when exclusion informa-
tion is provided after impressions of the relevant individuals have
been formed. This distinction provides an important direction for
further research.
Finally, if exclusion information is an important cue to relation-
ship and group membership, it may be transmitted in a number of
ways, including those that extend beyond verbal communication.
Particularly when communicating the exclusiveness of our own
relationships, we may take advantage of other channels such as
eye contact (mutual eye gaze as well as joint attention; e.g., Kurz-
ban, 2001) and behavioural mimicry (e.g., Lakin & Chartrand, 2003).
Conclusions
In sum, social exclusion provides important information about
others’—and perhaps our own—relationships. Exclusion exerts a
strong inﬂuence on how relationships are mentally represented.
These representations may subsequently inﬂuence judgments of
closeness along with other relationship characteristics, which
may in turn have important consequences for how we as per-
ceivers judge and behave towards members of those
relationships.
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